Biological and Chemical Weapons

At first sight, the advances made by chemical and biological disarmament seem to be satisfactory (high participation to prohibition conventions, progress in stockpiles destruction). However, in the field, some States lack transparency regarding certain programmes. Therefore, it could lead to a new arms race. Furthermore, the two Conventions are stagnating regarding the number of States parties: the deadlines imposed by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are not met while the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is not able to set up monitoring bodies necessary to an efficient implementation of these measures by the States. Besides, the discovery of undeclared chemical weapons in Libya, a State party to the Convention, has raised doubts about Syria once again, a State which is not party to the Convention but has been suspected of developing a chemical programme for years now.

GRIP focuses its work on: 

• The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the export control body which could contribute to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, the Australia Group.
• The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and its monitoring bodies: the Organisation for the prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) monitors the implementation of the Convention in the States and the Australia Group seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical and biological weapons.
• Some States’ programmes, which are suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological (Myanmar, North Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Syria among others).